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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

INCORPORATING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES INTO
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
POST-PADILLA

MICHAEL A. WOLFF*
INTRODUCTION
Padilla v. Kentucky startled the world of negotiated pleas with the
requirement that counsel inform the defendant of the deportation consequences
of pleading guilty to a criminal conviction.1 The question reverberating from
this opinion is whether those consequences go beyond the immigration context,
and if so, how far. The question I address is related: What role, if any, do
sentencing commissions have in providing additional information under the
Padilla framework?
I. THE PADILLA FRAMEWORK
The Supreme Court set out the standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel in Strickland v. Washington.2 Strickland clarified that the Sixth
Amendment3 guarantees a criminal defendant the right to effective assistance
of counsel.4 “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result.”5

* Professor of Law, Director of Center for Interdisciplinary Study of Law, Saint Louis University
School of Law; Judge, Supreme Court of Missouri, 1998-2011; Chair, Missouri Sentencing
Advisory Commission 2004-2011. The author thanks Susan Musser, law clerk; Alicia Ragsdale,
research assistant; and Jerina Phillips and Joseph Meyer, law clerk externs, for their research and
editing assistance.
1. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
2. 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
3. The Sixth Amendment says, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for this defense.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684–85.
4. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
5. Id.
183
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The Court set a basic two-step framework for evaluating ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.6 First, counsel’s assistance must be, in fact,
ineffective.7 Counsel is effective if his or her assistance was “reasonable
considering all the circumstances” so that the defendant received a fair trial.8
The Court declined to give much guidance as to what constitutes “reasonable,”
holding that the American Bar Association guidelines were instructive but not
determinative, and stating that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment was not to
improve the quality of the legal system but “to ensure that criminal defendants
receive a fair trial.”9
The second step of the Strickland analysis is whether the defendant has
been prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness.10 A defendant has been
prejudiced if “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”11
The Strickland analysis gives courts flexibility in determining what
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. The flipside of this flexibility is
disparate interpretations of Strickland’s impact on the ineffective assistance of
counsel analysis, as courts try to draw the line at what actions are egregious
enough to be “ineffective” and what, if anything, actually prejudices the
defendant.12 Nowhere is this uncertainty clearer than in courts’ struggles with
ineffective assistance of counsel in plea bargains. In an attempt to clarify the
Strickland analysis, lower courts have distinguished between direct and
collateral consequences of entering into a plea—counsel must advise
defendants of the direct consequences of plea-bargaining but not the collateral

6. Id. at 687.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 688.
9. Id. at 688–89.
10. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
11. Id. at 694.
12. See id. at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Today, for the first time, this Court attempts to
synthesize and clarify [ineffective assistance of counsel] standards. For the most part, the
majority’s efforts are unhelpful. Neither of its two principal holdings seems . . . likely to improve
the adjudication of Sixth Amendment claims.”).
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consequences.13 There has been great variation, however, in how courts have
delineated between direct and collateral consequences.14
Padilla v. Kentucky perhaps can be considered an attempt to clarify the
ineffective assistance of counsel analysis. The Padilla defendant had pleaded
guilty to the transportation of marijuana, a deportable offense.15 The defendant
said that his counsel told him that “he did not have to worry about immigration
status since he had been in the country so long.”16 His counsel was incorrect—
the charges that he pleaded guilty to made deportation “virtually mandatory.”17
The Court held that Padilla’s counsel was ineffective.18 Yet, in doing so,
the Court declined to apply the direct versus collateral consequences approach:
“Whether the distinction is appropriate is a question we need not consider in
this case because of the unique nature of deportation.”19 Instead, the Court
reviewed “the practice[s] and expectations of the legal community.”20 The
Court considered various ethical guidelines, such as the American Bar
Association’s, which all provide that counsel should advise defendants of the
deportation consequences of their decisions.21 The Court concluded that, given
the clarity of the law and the ease of determining that this was a deportable
offense, counsel was ineffective.22 Under this analysis, silence of defense
counsel is no longer sufficient to ensure that counsel is effectively representing
his or her client; instead, counsel has an affirmative duty to speak up and
advise his or her client of the deportation consequences of the guilty plea.23

13. See Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and
Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 124–25 (2009).
Lower federal and state courts have created this rule, stating that an individual’s guilty
plea is constitutionally valid even if that person was unaware of his conviction’s
“collateral” consequences. In other words, the individual pleading guilty need only be
informed about the “direct,” or penal, sanctions—such as jail or prison time, probationary
period or a fine—which will result from the conviction.
Id. at 124.
14. There are three main tests for distinguishing between direct and collateral consequences:
whether the consequences are “definite, immediate and largely automatic,” punitive, or “within
the ‘control and responsibility’ of the sentencing court.” See Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide
Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment
of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 689–93 (2008).
15. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477–78 (2010).
16. Id. at 1478 (quoting Kentucky v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008)).
17. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006).
18. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486–87.
19. Id. at 1481.
20. Id. at 1482 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“The proper
measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms.”)).
21. Id. at 1482–83.
22. Id. at 1483.
23. Id. at 1486.
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At this time, it is unclear whether Padilla’s analysis will extend beyond
deportation to encompass other consequences of pleading guilty.24
Nonetheless, it is clear that sentencing commissions may have the opportunity
to assist counsel in advising clients of the consequences of pleading guilty,
thus furthering Padilla and Strickland’s goal of ensuring fairness in the judicial
process.
II. SENTENCING COMMISSIONS
There are approximately twenty-one states that have sentencing
commissions, each with varying powers and responsibilities.25 The National
Center for State Courts has ranked them on a continuum26 that ranges from
highly prescriptive (mandatory) to merely descriptive (voluntary).27 Most
sentencing commissions set forth recommended or prescribed punishments for

24. See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693, 725–28
(2011); James Podgers & Mark Walsh, Weighing the Consequences: Task Force Probes Defense
Lawyers’ Role After Padilla, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2011, at 60.
25. The National Center for State Courts (hereinafter “NCSC”) has compiled information
from published and unpublished sources to provide the most accurate information on each state
Sentencing Commission. NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM (2008), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/csi/PEW-Profiles-v12-online.pdf. The primary goal of this NCSC
report is to provide comparative information on how alternative guideline systems are currently
working. Id. at 4. Further, by building on an earlier NCSC report, which was produced in 1997,
the NCSC has provided an updated and more comprehensive look into the field of structured
sentencing. Id. at 3 (citing NEAL B. KAUDER ET. AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
SENTENCING COMMISSION PROFILES: STATE SENTENCING POLICY AND PRACTICE RESEARCH IN
ACTION PARTNERSHIP (1997), available at http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?
CISOROOT=/criminal&CISOPTR=72).
26. Each state guideline system is given a rank based on its answers to a series of six
questions concerning its basic organizational structure. KAUDER & OSTROM, supra note 25, at 5.
The questions range from whether there are “compelling and substantial reasons required for
departures” to whether there is “appellate review of defendant-based challenges related to
sentencing guidelines.” Id. The questions shed light on which state sentencing systems are more
voluntary and which systems are more mandatory. Id. “For each question, a state is awarded 0
points for a ‘no or unlikely’ position, 1 point for a ‘possible or moderate’ position, and 2 points
for a ‘yes or likely’ position.” Id. States with more voluntary systems, such as Ohio and
Wisconsin, receive a lower point total; states with more mandatory systems, such as North
Carolina, receive higher total sums. Id.
27. For example, Ohio has a highly voluntary sentencing paradigm: judges are not required
to complete guideline worksheets; there is no statewide data regarding sentencing patterns or
practices; judges are allowed to depart from the guidelines for any reasons; sentencing departures
are not subject to appeal. Id. at 20. North Carolina, on the other hand, has a much more
mandatory sentencing paradigm: judges must impose a sentence within certain parameters; judges
are required to complete the sentencing judgment form; there are regular reports on the
sentencing commission; written justification is required if the court selects a minimum sentence
from the aggravated or mitigated sentence range. Id. at 19.
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felony offenses—the severity of the punishment is dependent on the offender’s
prior criminal history and the severity of the offense.28
Because the overwhelming majority of felony charges are disposed of after
plea negotiations, the sentencing commission prescriptions or
recommendations can play an important role in those negotiations.29
Currently, sentencing commissions only proscribe or recommend sentences to
be imposed; they do not deal with indirect or collateral consequences of those
sentences.30
I sent an e-mail question to most of the active sentencing commissions
asking whether the commission had taken any steps to accommodate the
principles set forth in Padilla v. Kentucky. None have done so. Nor have I
been able to find any reference on the Internet or in the periodic literature to
any such actions.
Missouri, where I served for seven years as chair of the sentencing
advisory commission, emphasizes the advisory nature of the commission’s
work; the commission recommends but does not prescribe punishments. It is
an information-based system, and it is ultimately up to the sentencing judge to
fashion a punishment within the statutory limits prescribed by law.31 By
contrast, states like North Carolina, Minnesota, and Washington are much
more prescriptive in their guidelines.32 But regardless of structure and role, all
such commissions serve as sources of information in the plea negotiation
context.

28. See Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, 22 CRIME
& JUST. 303, 304 (1997) (“After the seriousness of the crime, the criminal history of the offender
is the most important determinant of sentence severity in common-law jurisdictions.”).
29. In Missouri, statistics show that implementing the Commission’s sentencing
recommendations based on risk assessment results in lower recidivism. The Honorable Michael
A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public Safety Through State
Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389, 1412 (2008). This evidence-based sentencing
works to reduce recidivism by evaluating the risk of each offender and the effectiveness of
different treatments. Id. at 1408–11. The Commission’s recommendations are especially
important to the prosecutors and defense attorneys who exercise judgment in negotiating plea
bargains which “address the individual needs of offenders and minimize the risk to public safety
in allowing them to serve their sentences in the community rather than in prison.” Id. at 1408–09.
30. See KAUDER & OSTROM, supra note 25.
31. Michael A. Wolff, Missouri’s Information-Based Discretionary Sentencing System, 4
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 95, 97 (2006) (“In promulgating its system of recommendations, the
Commission proclaimed: ‘Judicial discretion is the cornerstone of sentencing in Missouri courts.’
Missouri has a ‘fully voluntary system.’ The judge is free to impose any sentence within the
punishments set by statute. There is no appellate review, except for a contention that a sentence
is contrary to statute.” (footnotes omitted)).
32. KAUDER & OSTROM, supra note 25, at 17, 19, 26.
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III. WHAT ARE THE INFORMATION NEEDS BEFORE SENTENCING?
If information is the coin of the realm, what information should be
imparted? First, it is important to refer to the analytical framework of Padilla
v. Kentucky. Padilla held that immigration consequences are “integral part—
indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be
imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”33
Criteria for inclusion as “integral” are whether the consequences are virtually
certain to occur and are “truly clear.”34 Second, we should try to ascertain
what consequences fit these criteria.
The recently proposed Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction
Act (hereinafter “Collateral Consequences Act”) makes some highly useful
distinctions among the different types of consequences of pleading guilty.35
The Collateral Consequences Act uses the phrase “collateral sanction” to refer
to a legal disability that occurs by operation of law because of the conviction
but is not part of the sentence for the crime.36 It also proposes that certain
consequences, in addition to deportation, should be disclosed prior to a guilty
plea: being unable to get or keep some licenses, permits, or jobs; being unable
to keep or get benefits such as public housing or education; receiving a harsher
sentence if convicted of another offense in the future; having the government
take the offender’s property; and being unable to vote or to possess a firearm.37
The practical problem that confronts defense counsel, sentencing
commissions, and the uniform laws commissioners is that hardly anyone
knows the full range of consequences of a conviction. “While some
disabilities may be well known, such as disenfranchisement and the firearms
prohibition, in most jurisdictions no judge, prosecutor, defense attorney,
legislator, or agency staffer could identify all of the statutes that would be
triggered by conviction of the various offenses in the criminal code.”38 The
Supreme Court’s premise in Padilla is that a competent attorney—judged by
the standards of the legal profession—would know and disclose the
deportation consequences of a conviction.39
But do the standards of the profession require knowledge of a whole range
of consequences? The Padilla opinion makes specific reference to the
33. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010).
34. Id. at 1483 (“[W]hen the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the
duty to give correct advice is equally clear.”).
35. See UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT § 2 (2010).
36. Id. § 2(2). The act also uses the term “disqualification” to mean “a penalty, disability, or
disadvantage, however denominated, that an administrative agency, governmental official, or
court in a civil proceeding is authorized, but not required, to impose on an individual on grounds
relating to the individual’s conviction of an offense.” Id. § 2(5).
37. Id. § 5.
38. Id. § 4 cmt.
39. 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
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National Legal Aid and Defender Association (hereinafter “NLADA”)
Compendium of Standards for Indigent Defense Systems and the American
Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice.40 “The NLADA compendium
states that ‘prior to the entry of the plea, counsel should . . . make certain that
the client fully and completely understands . . . the consequences the accused
will be exposed to by entering a plea.’”41 “[T]he ABA standards state that ‘[t]o
the extent possible, defense counsel should determine and advise the
defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of any plea, as to the possible
collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the contemplated
plea.’”42
IV. LISTING THE CONSEQUENCES
Beyond the list of collateral consequences that the Collateral
Consequences Act would require to be disclosed—that is, licenses, permits,
jobs, public benefits, harsher sentences in the future, confiscation of property,
inability to vote or possess a firearm—the commissioners indicate that
“advising a defendant of some collateral sanctions without addressing all of
them may be misleading” because disclosing only a select few of the various
collateral consequences may inevitably mislead the defendant to believe that
what has been disclosed is all that is at stake.43 In order to provide
comprehensive information, Section 4(a) of the Collateral Consequences Act
would require “each state to create a collection with citations to and short
descriptions of any provisions in the state constitution, statutes and
administrative rules that create collateral sanctions and authorize
disqualifications.”44 The goal, of course, is to provide “clear and accurate
information” as to the legal effects of a conviction.45

40. Id. (citing PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION
Guideline 6.2 (Nat’l Legal Aid & Defender Ass’n 1994); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-5.1(a) (3d ed. 1993);
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14-3.2(f) (3d ed. 1999)).
41. Webb v. State, 334 S.W.3d 126, 137 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) (Wolff, J., concurring)
(quoting 2 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE
SYSTEMS H11 (2000), available at http://www.mynlada.org/defender/DOJ/standardsv2/v2h.htm).
42. Id. at 138 (quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY
Standard 14-3.2(f)).
43. UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT § 5 cmt. For instance,
according to a comment published by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, “it would be reasonable but incorrect for a defendant pleading guilty in Wyoming to
assume that because the court advised that firearms privileges and ‘federal benefits’ might be lost,
no state benefits, such as access to public housing, were at risk.” Id.
44. Id. § 4 cmt.
45. Id. § 5 cmt.
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In trying to ascertain what information should be provided, it may be
useful to consider what a reasonable defendant would want to know prior to
pleading guilty and what information, if not disclosed until after the plea,
would cause a reasonable defendant to want to withdraw the plea. This line of
inquiry—which produces an analysis similar to the prejudice determination
made under Strickland v. Washington46—does not seem helpful because it is
highly individualized to the circumstances of a particular offender and the
offense, and therefore not readily adaptable to a list of consequences that might
serve a more general purpose and a general population of offenders in plea
negotiations and sentencing.
There are some consequences that are already the subject of disclosures
required in some states under court rules and statutes. Even before Padilla,
twenty-six states required notification as to deportation consequences, either
by statute or rule.47 A number of other states require notification, by court or
statute, as to other consequences, such as possessing firearms, losing public
benefits, and registration as sex offenders.48 Only six states that have
introduced the Collateral Consequences Act as recently amended, so the
process of filling the need for accurate information has either not begun or is in
very early stages in many states.49
V. A USEFUL ROLE FOR SENTENCING COMMISSIONS
In states with sentencing commissions that have not adopted the Uniform
Collateral Consequences of Convictions Act, the sentencing commission may
find a useful role to play in listing and disclosing consequences of convictions
that have heretofore been considered collateral.50

46. 466 U.S. 668, 691–96 (1984). Pursuant to the Strickland analysis:
When a defendant challenges a death sentence, . . . the question is whether there is a
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer—including an appellate court,
to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence—would have concluded that the
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.
Id. at 695. In Strickland, the Supreme Court found “insufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside
[the] death sentence” because the omitted evidence would not have likely changed the outcome of
the sentence. Id. at 699.
47. UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT § 5 cmt.
48. Id.
49. In 2011, Colorado, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Vermont, and West Virginia
introduced the amended Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act. Collateral Consequences of
Conviction Act: Legislative Tracking, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.nccusl.org/Act.aspx?
title=CollateralConsequences of Conviction Act (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). Rather than alter
existing law or create new law, this Act strives to make formal state laws understandable to the
ordinary citizens of each state. UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT § 4
cmt.
50. “What the courts have done, prior to Padilla, is to label all consequences, other than the
sentence itself, as ‘collateral’ as a way to remove them from the constitutional protection of the
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In a highly useful article, Professor Chin, one of the symposium speakers,
has made a series of helpful suggestions as to what should be included in the
lists of consequences.51 However, there can be many consequences of a single
conviction, so there is a need to simplify the list, because a complete list that is
so long as to be incomprehensible is useless.52 Moreover, most states’ criminal
statutes have hundreds of offenses, many of which are rarely charged.53 In this
context, Professor Chin advocates publishing lists of the consequences of a
state’s twenty-five most frequently charged offenses.54 Such lists would
include:
 The immigration consequences of the twenty-five most common
offenses of conviction.
 Other major collateral consequences of the twenty-five most common
offenses of conviction.
 Crimes leading to loss of public benefits.
 Crimes leading to loss of parental or other family rights.
 Crimes leading to sex offender registration, notification, and
incarceration.
 Crimes leading to the loss of the right to vote, serve on a jury, hold
office or possess a firearm.
 Any available methods under state law for relieving collateral
consequences.55
Sentencing commissions have websites that impart a great deal of
information about proposed sentences.56 It would not be that difficult to
include a listing of collateral consequences and disqualifications that flow from
various kinds of felonies. It makes sense for a sentencing commission to do so
because they are a significant provider of information to the plea negotiation
process, which is precisely where the information as to collateral consequences

Sixth Amendment right to competent representation.” Webb v. State, 334 S.W.3d 126, 139 (Mo.
2011) (en banc) (Wolff, J., concurring) (citing Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr.,
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697,
700–01 (2002)). Now that Padilla has imposed a duty on defense counsel to inform defendants
of consequences that are “truly clear,” sentencing commissions are in the best position to identify
consequences of convictions of the various offenses in the criminal code. See id. at 134.
51. Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral
Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675, 686–87 (2011).
52. “[T]he more complete a dataset is, the less understandable, and hence useful, it will be,
and vice versa.” Id. at 686.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 686–87.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., MO. SENTENCING ADVISORY COMM’N, http://www.mosac.mo.gov (last visited
Jan. 30, 2012); PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, http://pcs.la.psu.edu/ (last modified Dec. 1, 2011).
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is needed. Especially in states that have discretionary sentencing that is merely
informed by recommendations of a sentencing commission, providing such
additional information makes the commission helpful in the sentencing process
and more likely to be consulted by counsel and the courts.
CONCLUSION
States that have sentencing commissions commonly express their goals as
promoting fairness, consistency, and rationality in sentencing, as well as
promoting public safety.57 When consequences ensue from convictions, they
may affect offenders in vastly different ways—for some, a consequence may
be deportation, and for others, the consequence may be loss of employment or
educational opportunities.58 If reduction of disparities—a frequently stated
goal of sentencing commissions—is intended, it seems natural that a
sentencing commission would find a useful role in providing information about
the consequences of convictions. Sentencing laws and their consequences can
become so complicated that there are instances when it seems that no one—not
the defense counsel, probation officer, or judge—knows the full impact of a
sentence.59
To the extent that sentencing commissions, through their publications and
especially through the information made available on their websites, can
provide this information, they can promote sentencing in which all participants
are informed sufficiently to meet the effective assistance of counsel
requirement. This not only avoids post-conviction proceedings in which the
offender claims that his attorney did not provide competent representation, but
as importantly helps commissions to meet their goals of fairness and
transparency.

57. See KAUDER & OSTROM, supra note 25, at 7–27.
58. See Webb v. State, 334 S.W.3d 126, 136 n.8 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) (Wolff, J.,
concurring) (citing cases from other jurisdictions decided since Padilla); see also Thomas v.
United States, No. RWT-10-2274, No. PMD-06-4572, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41537, at *10–11
(D. Md. Apr. 15, 2011) (declining to extend Padilla where defendant was not advised of potential
employment-related consequences of a guilty plea because deportation is a much more severe
consequence of a criminal conviction than being deprived of the ability to pursue one’s chosen
profession); Blaise v. State, No. 10–0466, 2011 WL 2078091, at *4 (Iowa App. May 25, 2011)
(affirming the denial of appellant’s application for post-conviction relief because trial counsel had
no duty to inform appellant that he might be subject to civil commitment as a sexually violent
predator in pleading guilty to first-degree harassment); Calvert v. State, 342 S.W.3d 477, 491–92
(Tenn. 2011) (finding that defense council’s performance was deficient when counsel did not
advise defendant that his guilty plea would result in a mandatory sentence of community
supervision for life).
59. See Webb, 334 S.W.3d at 140 (Wolff, J., concurring).

